

Office alternation in parliamentary democracies: Cabinets, parties and prime ministers compared

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- First draft -

1. Introduction

Italian post-war governments were notorious for their high degree of instability and the dominance of a single party. Between 1946 and 1994, when the *mani pulite*-campaign led to a downfall of the existing party system, Italy experienced 50 cabinets with 20 prime ministers and a single party, the Christian Democrats (DC), as the dominant member of all these cabinets. Similarly between 1946 and 1976, Sweden was governed by a single party, the social democratic SAP. The difference to Italy is that during these 30 years in Sweden only two different prime ministers were in power: Tage Erlander and Olof Palme. Applying the threefold standard definition of what constitutes a government termination (1. elections; 2. change in party composition; 3. change in prime minister), these two politicians headed 13, predominantly single party cabinets. Similar patterns have occurred in Japan and Ireland with single parties persistently leading cabinets (LDP and Fianna Fáil respectively) but a high degree of turnover among the prime ministers. Hence government stability is in the eye of the beholder and office duration varies according to the unit in power we look at: the whole cabinet, a ruling party or the person of the prime minister.

Nevertheless, recent work in political science tends to focus on one aspect of office duration at a time only. First, scholars have investigated the duration of cabinets and identified institutional as well as political and ideological causes of cabinet survival and termination (King, Alt, Burns, & Laver, 1990; Laver, 2003; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009; Warwick, 1994). Second, a significant amount of work has focused on leader duration, either by looking at the chief executives (Bienen & van de Walle, 1991), presidents (Samuels, 2004), or party leaders (Andrews & Jackman, 2008). Third, a few studies have looked at parties in office (Maeda & Nishikawa, 2006; Nishikawa, 2011) and have shown that ruling party stability is related to the type of electoral system (FPTP vs. PR) as well as to the type of party-system (two-party vs. multi-party).

Hence existing work tends to look almost exclusively on a single unit – cabinets, parties or leaders – when investigating office duration. It is only the recent work by Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2004, 2008) that highlights differences in office duration between cabinet duration and office experience by ministers, “making it impossible to rely primarily on arguments about cabinet duration to explain patterns of individual stability” (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008:

169). A similar argument can be made for the durability of parties: the causes of ruling party durability may differ from those explaining the duration of cabinets. But how are office duration of cabinets, prime ministers and parties interrelated? In this paper we aim at taking a broader perspective on office duration by systematically comparing the three aforementioned types of office durability and their respective reasons for termination: we look at cabinets, parties in office and individuals (prime ministers). For this purpose we make use of a data set that allows us to analyze these different units of office stability within 21 parliamentary democracies from 1946 until 2011.

2. Existing work, Theory and Hypothesis

We use the term office duration to refer to all three levels we are investigating: the literature on government duration that looks at cabinets by using a standard definition of cabinet change; work on office survival of individuals, often referred to as leader(ship) duration; and studies on the duration of parties in cabinet. We start by discussing classic and recent works on cabinet duration, the most extend literature, in more detail before we derive our own hypothesis how office duration may differ across the units we analyse.

2.1. Results of government survival analyses

The large number of studies on cabinet survival conducted so far is a natural starting point for deriving hypotheses and identifying relevant variables (see Saalfeld (2008) for a summary). Across this work, there are some factors like the type of government (majority vs. minority / minimum winning vs. surplus coalition) or the fractionalization of parliament that have proven to be influential in numerous studies and therefore can be regarded as robust determinants of cabinet duration. Nevertheless, these studies came to only partially similar results across a set of other variables. Because of the different theoretical approaches and operationalization of the dependent variable (see section 3.3 below) as well as the independent variables the overlap of the results is (unsurprisingly) far from perfect. Table 1 gives an overview of the attributes that were found to have significant effects on government survival in the respective studies.¹ Our study controls for these potentially relevant attributes thereby trying to reexamine the results of the former studies. In his recent summary of comparative work on cabinet duration Saalfeld (2008, 338) forms six ‘blocks’ to cluster causes of cabinet durability: spatial-temporal, structural, preference-based, institutional, bargaining-environment and critical-events based explanations. These blocks, augmented with hypotheses derived from studies on party stability (Maeda & Nishikawa, 2006; Nishikawa, 2011) and individual prime minister stability, provide the framework for the statistical analysis in this paper.

¹ Though the list of studies is not exhaustive, all relevant trends in the literature are represented.

Table 1: Attributes that have shown significant effects on government survival in former studies

	Number of gov. parties / type of gov.	Fractionalization of the parliament	Ideological diversity between all parl., the governing or opp. Parties	Polarization within the parliament	Formal investiture requirement	Economic characteristics of the system	constitutional requirements for dissolution of parliament/ dismissal of government
Lowell (1896)	+ (SPG)	/	/	/	/	/	/
Riker (1965) / Axelrod (1970)	+ (MWC/MWC)	/	/	/	/	/	/
Taylor and Herman (1971)	+ (SPG/MWC)	+	-	+	/	/	/
Warwick (1979)	+ (MWC)	+	+ (gov.)	/	/	/	/
Robertson (1984)	-	-	-	-	/	+	/
Strøm (1985)	+ (majority)	-	/	-	-	/	/
King et al. (1990)	+ (majority)	+	+ (opp.)	+	+	/	/
Warwick (1994)	+	+	+	+	+	+	/
Saalfeld (2008)	+ (majority, MWC)	+	-	+	+	+	+
Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009)	+ (minority)	-	-	/	-	/	+

A “+“ indicates significant influence on government duration, a “-“ indicates no influence and a “/” stands for not tested.

2.2. Theory and hypotheses

How are the office duration of cabinets, prime ministers and parties related? First and foremost it is straight forward to see that a party in office may include multiple prime ministers and potentially even more cabinets. By definition, a resignation of the prime minister causes the fall of a cabinet but the party may be a member of the next cabinet as well. Hence parties that generally provide the prime minister should be longer in office than prime ministers and on average they are of course longer in office than cabinets. This argument should differ for smaller parties in coalition cabinets that can be replaced more frequently. However, to what an extent do the causes of office duration differ between these categories? Resorting to the ‘blocks’ raised by Saalfeld helps to structure our hypotheses:

2.2.1. Spatial and temporal effects


The first block (spatial-temporal causes) includes a set of control variable to gain better insights about the causal structures underlying potential **country- and time-effects**. These variables allow to track

changes across time and between the parliamentary systems we study. We will test these fixed effects by using country- and decade-dummies.

2.2.2. Structural effects

Structural effects summarize variables characterizing the structure of the cabinet and the parliamentary framework. A first effect that has to be tested is the **type of cabinet**. Here, we distinguish between single party majority governments (SPG), single party minority cabinets (SPMIN), minimal winning cabinets (MWC), multiparty minority governments (MPMIN), surplus coalitions (SC) and caretaker governments (CARE). For the different types of governments we cannot only hypothesize different effects for our three different dependent variables, but we must additionally distinguish between the type of terminal event. Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) have demonstrated that a pooled model – including all types of terminal events in the same way – ignores a number of important effects. According to their work, it is necessary to distinguish between early elections and replacements of cabinets. Once a new bargaining solution occurs, a cabinet may either decide to call early elections or may be replaced by another one. Figure 1 indicates clear differences in the duration of cabinets that ended due to a technical reason, those ending because of cabinet replacements during the legislative term and those terminated because of an early dissolution of parliament and early elections. Technical terminations obviously present the category with the longest durations, as these are first and foremost governments that ended because of regular elections after the maximum possible legislative term.² Governments ending in early elections are on average more than 200 days longer than those being replaced during a legislative term. This measure does already indicate that there are significant differences between early elections and replacements in terms of their duration and we investigate these types of terminal events in separate models.

Figure 1: Cabinet durations according to the type of terminal event



² We come back to the topic of technical terminations in section 3.1 in the course of discussing the censoring regime.

For single party governments (regardless if SPG or SPMIN) strategic election timing should be easier as the governing party does not have to find agreement with coalition partners about the scheduling of a parliamentary dissolution and early elections. On the other hand these governments should be more durable in terms of replacements as by definition it is not possible that a governing party drops out of the cabinet and at least for SPG it is not necessary to include further parties. Therefore we assume SPG and SPMIN to have lower replacement hazards while MWC and especially SC and MPMIN should have higher ones. Caretaker governments are assumed to exhibit shorter durations due to the limited mandate they are given. Our expectations about prime ministerial and party duration follow this logic: While the hazard for a prime minister to end his term in office due to a replacement should be higher for those who serve in cabinets that are generally regarded as being more instable (minority governments and surplus coalitions), we only expect prime ministers who's term in office is characterized by a high proportion of days as the head of a caretaker government to have much higher hazards than all other types of government. The same effect should also be found for party duration. Furthermore, as replacements of SPG and SGMIN are in general due to a change in the prime minister, but not in the (single) governing party, we assume these two to have smaller early election hazards for party duration than the remaining types of cabinet.

Fragmentation of parliament is assumed to be another structural attribute affecting office duration. The higher this measure, the more complex the bargaining environment (Laver & Schofield, 1990) which in turn leads to a higher probability of cabinet replacements. These replacements can be due to changes in the party composition or in the prime minister and therefore fragmentation should also increase the replacement hazard for prime ministers and parties alike. The effective number of parliamentary parties, calculated according to Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) formula is used to measure parliamentary fragmentation. Fragmentation can also be calculated based on the number of cabinet ministers and their party affiliation. The hypotheses for **cabinet fragmentation** are straightforward: If there is a high number of effective cabinet parties, trouble among them is more likely to occur, increasing the possibility of replacements, whereas the higher complexity of the inner governmental bargaining environment reduces the hazard for early elections. Fewer cabinet parties will find it easier to agree on an early dissolution of parliament than a larger number of parties (at least if all cabinet parties are pivotal in keeping a parliamentary majority). As the fragmentation effect is tested on top of the type of cabinet effect, we do not assume to find large effects especially for early elections, because the argument that a lower fragmentation leads to an easier adoption of early elections should be true especially for single party governments which are covered by the type of government variable.

We also test for the effect of the **electoral system** with a variable distinguishing between first past the post (FPTP) and proportional representation (PR) systems. Classical theories see PR-systems as generating a more instable political environment (Duverger, 1964; Sartori, 1966) especially because of

their increasing effects on fragmentation. With fragmentation included into our study, we do not expect to find a further effect of the electoral system on cabinet replacements. For early elections, previous studies have shown that an effect of the electoral system additional to party fragmentation effect exists (Jäckle, 2011, p.298). Therefore in PR-systems governments should have lower early election hazard rates. For the effects on prime ministerial and party duration the effects of the electoral system are less clear cut. Nishikawa is skeptical about finding effects of electoral systems on party duration: “the pattern of turnover is rather complex [which makes it in his view also] misleading to compare only the average survival time between FPTP and PR” (Nishikawa, 2011, p.5). Nevertheless, we include the electoral system variable and test the potentially diverse effects on prime minister and party duration.

A further attribute that can be subsumed under the category of structural effects is the **age of the prime minister**. We assume older prime ministers to have a higher hazard for leaving cabinet. This should also impact to some extent on the duration of cabinets, especially on the replacement hazard rate and less so on early elections, but not on party duration.

2.2.3. Preference based effects

Two preference based effects shall be tested: With the **mean left-right-position of parliament** we test if a more left- or right-wing dominated parliamentary environment gives rise to more durable cabinets. We calculate the same measure also for cabinet parties only. Thereby we test if the **mean ideological position of a cabinet** affects its duration. The basic argument for the second ideological variable can be summarized as follows: **ideological differences** between the parties within a cabinet coalition have an impact on the durability of the government. Those differences, measured by the standard deviation (sd) of their ideological positions, are an indication of potential conflicts within a government. We use the classic left-right ideological scale³ and assume that coalitions with large ideological differences are more fragile than ideologically compact governments. This effect should primarily be the result of a higher hazard for replacements. By definition single party governments do not have an ideological difference value. To account for the fact that there are always certain factions within a ruling party, especially if the party is large, we set the sd-values for SPG and SPMIN to half of the average sd calculated for all cabinets. Multiplying this value with the relative frequency of the parties' seat share allows larger parties to have ideologically more distant factions.

³ The measures for the ideological positions are included in the ParlGov dataset. They are calculated as the mean of various expert surveys (Benoit & Laver, 2006; Castles & Mair, 1984; Huber & Inglehart, 1995; Ray, 1999) and thus are time-invariant.

2.2.4. Institutional effects

Four variables depicting the institutional environment shall be controlled for: First, the necessity of an **investiture vote** which has been shown to increase the probability of replacements but not so of early elections (Saalfeld, 2008, p.353). Second, **constitutional constraints to call for early elections** are included. Following Kayser (2005) we distinguish between three types of countries: First those, in which the head of government has de jure as well as de facto the option to dissolve the parliament (either by his own rights or by exploiting the majority faction within parliament). Second, countries where constitutional requirements severely constrain the possibilities to call for early elections, like in Germany where the dissolution of parliament is only feasible when linked with a motion of confidence. The third category consists of countries where early elections are impossible because of constitutional reasons (e.g. Norway) or where there few incentives to call them (Sweden) exist.

We account for the fact that a government coming into office directly after an election can stay longer till the next election emerges than a government which has been replaced during the constitutional interelection period. In line with previous research (King et al., 1990, p.859; Warwick, 1994, p.154 ff) we therefore assume cabinets with **post-election status** to have lower hazards (pooled, replacement and early election) than those coming into office during the legislative term. The fourth institutional variable in our models is the **time remaining till the end of the constitutional interelection period (CIEP)**. With this measure we control on the one hand for the different lengths of legislative terms (from 3 years in Australia to 6 years in Luxembourg until 1959) and on the other hand on the potential time remaining for a government, until it definitely has to face elections. We assume the early election hazard to be smaller with a longer time remaining, because governments will always balance the potential chances to gain a new electoral term against the secure time remaining till the end of the CIEP. For replacements instead we hypothesize no effect on the hazard rate.

3. Method and data

3.1. Event history analysis

We use the extensive literature on government survival as methodological basis for our analysis (cf. Laver, 2003). Quantitative studies of cabinet survival have matured over the last four decades. These studies can be divided into three consecutive periods using distinct statistical methods which nonetheless are based upon the forgoing methodology – attribute approaches, stochastic approaches and combined approaches.

Apart from much earlier work (e.g. Lowell, 1896), explicit academic studies on government survival started in the 1970s with research on structural attributes. An example for these kinds of studies, mostly using simple correlation and linear regression methods, is provided by Axelrod (1970), who identified coalitions that consist of the necessary majority and whose parties are *ideological neighbors*,

or as he puts it which are “minimal connected winning coalitions”, as more stable than others. Other scholars following an attribute approach were Blondel (1968), Taylor and Herman (1971), Dodd (1976), Warwick (1979) and Strøm (1985). All these studies share the basic *deterministic* assumption that government termination is solely predetermined by the structural attributes, as they existed at the time, when the government came into office (Browne, Frensdreis, & Gleiber, 1986, p.649).

Browne, Frensdreis and Gleiber criticized these studies for generally having a too small explanatory power. Therefore they proposed a different approach centering more on the actual causes of government terminations. These causes are critical events, as for example wars, economic crisis, political scandals or conflicts within the coalition which the political actors perceive as demands. When they cannot, or are not willing to, fulfill these demands, a government is going to end. Thus in this model, government survival only depends on the occurrence of such critical events. The basic assumption made by Browne and his colleagues is that their occurrence is completely random and hence can be modeled as a stochastic process. Event history analysis (EHA) is in their view the appropriate method to tackle such research questions. The empirical analysis nonetheless has shown that such a completely stochastic approach, modeling government durations solely via a probability distribution of critical events, cannot explain sufficiently the duration variances in most countries (Browne et al., 1986, p.640-644). Therefore the group around Browne conceded that further covariates must be taken into account when they declared: „the immediate theoretical task is to construct a working model of governmental life-cycle which incorporates the findings of both the structural attributes and random events models“ (Frensdreis, Gleiber, & Browne, 1986, p.626).

The first attempt of bringing these two approaches together which up to that date stood in clear opposition to each other⁴, was made by King, Alt, Burns and Laver (1990). Their Unified Statistical Model, according to the four scholars also called **KABL-model**, builds on a hazard rate conditional on government attributes, the baseline hazard is nevertheless assumed to be constant. Although King and his colleagues gained better estimation results compared to the pure stochastic approach, the KABL-model is problematic in two ways: First the use of a certain specified baseline hazard – in the KABL-model a constant one – makes the model inflexible and when this parameterization is not appropriate and estimation results would be heavily biased.⁵ The second assumption, the decision for strategic

⁴ A short, but very instructive, insight into the intense debate between advocates of the structural attributes approach on the one hand and event theorists on the other hand provides the article by Strøm et al. (1988).

⁵ There is a number of additional fully parametric models (e.g. Weibull, Gompertz, Log-Logistic) which all try to model the time-dependence in event-history-data directly through setting up a function describing the dependency between elapsed time and the survival period. A correct specification of this baseline hazard is indispensable for a meaningful estimation. With regard to the two possible causes of time-dependency, real dependence of time and “unreal” time-dependence because of unobserved heterogeneity (Blossfeld, Golsch, & Rohwer, 2007, p.184; Vermunt, 1997, p.189), it becomes clear that especially adopting the second view, it is impossible to determine the baseline function a priori on theoretical grounds. An inspection of the empirical hazard-rates via the life-table-method can also at best give some hints about the functional form of the baseline hazard, but cannot be used for an exact definition. Therefore the functional specification of the baseline hazard

censoring (all governments that end at maximum one year before the end of the constitutional interelection period (CIEP) are censored), poses further problems. Therefore in this study a Cox-model (Cox, 1975) is used that builds on a certain time dependence, but does not require to posit a specific functional form of the baseline hazard rate (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Yamaguchi, 1991).

The **Cox-model** enables researchers to estimate the influence of attributes on the hazard rate, without knowing the functional form of the baseline hazard and thus without the danger of introducing error into the model through a misspecification of the underlying hazard (Yamaguchi, 1991, p.101f). No strategic censoring shall be applied additionally since this approach excludes exactly those observations that are most interesting for the analysis (Diermeier & Stevenson, 2000, p.635f).

Censoring will only be used for those cabinets terminating due to technical reasons which are regular elections, death of the prime minister, constitutional requirements, regular elections and the end of the observation period (01.01.2012). Furthermore we apply a competing risks approach (cf. Diermeier & Stevenson, 1999, 2000), distinguishing between a pooled model, only censoring those governments ending due to technical reasons, a replacement model, censoring additionally governments ending with early elections and an early election model, censoring technical reasons plus replacements. A further advantage of the Cox-model is its ability to handle time-varying covariates such as the age of the prime minister. In practical terms this means to expand the dataset on a daily basis. Additionally to this time varying covariate, those variables that are time-invariant within the cabinet duration models, such as the type of government, become potentially time varying when used in the prime ministerial or party duration models, as the type of government can be changing throughout a premier or party spell. The statistical approach developed so far can be applied to all three dependent variables.

3.2. Definition of the dependent variable

As we have emphasized in the introduction of our paper, a high cabinet alternation rate may either be due to frequent changes within the party composition of cabinets or to the fact that prime ministers leave office more often in some countries than in others. Dogan (1989, p.239) emphasizes exactly this point when he demonstrates that cabinets in the French fourth republic were short lived but the corps of the ministerial elite was rather small over this period and individuals remained in office for long period. Work on cabinet duration is highly sensitive to the exact definition of a cabinet and the events that are counted as initial and terminal events for a government (cp. Saalfeld, 2008: 329). Here we

constitutes the most serious drawback for the use of fully parametric models like the KABL-model (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p.85-87).

follow the standard threefold definition of government termination that is also widespread in existing datasets (Müller & Strom, 2000; Woldendorp, Keman, & Budge, 1993, 1998, 2000):⁶

- 1) Changes in the party composition of the cabinet (i.e. a party holding a ministerial office drops out of the government or a new party steps into the cabinet).
- 2) Change and resignations of the prime minister.
- 3) Parliamentary elections (even if the party composition does not change; hence the maximum office duration of a cabinet is defined by the length of the legislative term).

Our two other dependent variables – the duration of parties in office, and the duration of prime ministers in power – can therefore be seen as a defining component of cabinet duration. The following section provides an empirical overview of the dependent variables before we proceed with our duration models in section four.

3.3. Data

In our study, we focus on established industrial democracies and base our data set on the ParlGov data infrastructure (Döring and Manow 2012). More specifically, we select parliamentary and semi-presidential countries that have been democratic for at least thirty years.⁷ This leaves us with 21 countries to study. Table 2 gives a first impression of the data with respect to cabinet, party and prime ministerial duration. Looking at the number of cabinets, there is an obvious variance between the countries. Leaving aside Spain, Portugal and Greece which entered the democratic arena thirty years after the rest of our sample, we find on the one extreme Luxembourg with less than 20 cabinets during the period 1945-2011 and on the other extreme France and Italy with more than 50 governments over the same period. The mean cabinet duration among the countries ranges between less than 300 days and more than 1200 days. The fifth column of table two contains the number of prime ministers who have served in office. Here again we find significant differences: in France 37 different persons were prime minister, whereas in Germany there had only been 8 over the same period.

The countries differ also with respect to the possibility of a prime minister to return into the prime ministerial office: In Japan none of the 30 prime ministers returned into office after his career has once been terminated. In Finland on the other hand 1/3 of the prime ministerial spells has been filled with prime ministers who had already been in office before. The mean prime ministerial duration presents an even larger range and variance than the mean cabinet duration. The last office duration variable we are investigating is party duration. Austria with a record of longlasting grand-coalitions presents the highest value, while the mean party duration in Portugal and Greece is the lowest within our sample.

⁶ For a discussion of this threefold definition within government survival literature see Jäckle (2011, p.34-37).

⁷ Israel is not included in the ParlGov data infrastructure and therefore not part of the study.

Temporal measures such as the mean durations hide some of the underlying stability patterns.

Therefore the last three columns in table 2 present three further possibilities to capture governmental stability:

Table 2: Office durations by country

country	start date (mm/dd/yyyy) end date for all: 01/01/2012	number of cabinets	mean cabinet duration	number of prime ministers (returning prime ministers counted repeatedly)	mean prime minister duration	mean party duration	number of cabinets with exactly same party composition as the foregoing cabinet (as percentage of all governments - 1)	alternation rate	returnability
AUS	11/01/1946	33	721,3	13 (13)	2866,6	4663,8	26 (81,3 %)	21,1 %	81,3 %
AUT	12/20/1945	30	803,9	11 (11)	2757,8	5251,9	21 (72,4 %)	7,8 %	89,7 %
BEL	03/13/1946	42	558,8	18 (25)	1473,5	2277,4	16 (39,0 %)	24,1 %	75,4 %
CAN	06/11/1945	27	900,4	12 (13)	2390,5	3038,8	19 (73,1 %)	28,1 %	73,1 %
DEU	09/20/1949	34	947,8	8 (8)	3783,5	4227,5	12 (36,4 %)	18,8 %	82,5 %
DNK	11/07/1945	25	690,3	13 (16)	2124,5	2004,6	16 (66,7 %)	23,5 %	66,1 %
ESP	07/04/1977	11	1145,4	5 (5)	3123,6	3149,8	7 (70,0 %)	29,4 %	70,0 %
FIN	09/21/1944	44	527,0	21 (31)	1005,6	1428,3	4 (9,3 %)	25,9 %	75,4 %
FRA	11/21/1945	54	391,0	37 (44)	697,6	1520,1	21 (39,6 %)	25,8 %	76,0 %
GBR	07/26/1945	24	1011,0	13 (14)	2113,1	2762,8	16 (69,6 %)	32,3 %	69,6 %
GRC	11/21/1974	15	888,3	9 (10)	1927,9	1242,9	8 (57,1 %)	42,4 %	64,3 %
IRL	06/09/1944	26	949,1	12 (19)	1660,0	1566,7	9 (36,0 %)	53,1 %	46,7 %
ISL	06/30/1946	31	771,8	17 (22)	1476,6	2257,7	11 (36,7 %)	33,4 %	73,1 %
ITA	07/13/1946	57	397,2	23 (37)	935,1	1345,8	18 (32,1 %)	15,2 %	73,6 %
JPN	04/25/1947	49	460,0	30 (30)	1027,6	1471,9	30 (62,5 %)	22,7 %	78,6 %
LUX	11/14/1945	19	1271,3	7 (8)	3790,3	3788,6	8 (44,4 %)	30,6 %	75,0 %
NLD	07/03/1946	29	824,9	14 (15)	2233,6	2831,5	5 (17,9 %)	28,8 %	71,8 %
NOR	11/05/1945	30	805,4	13 (20)	1514,2	1304,1	14 (48,3 %)	41,5 %	49,4 %
NZL	12/20/1946	30	791,8	15 (16)	2160,7	2323,7	17 (58,6 %)	35,3 %	65,5 %
PRT	07/23/1976	20	643,0	11 (12)	1384,6	1172,7	8 (42,1 %)	44,1 %	57,9 %
SWE	07/31/1945	30	808,7	9 (12)	4033,9	2274,6	19 (65,5 %)	19,8 %	78,7 %

The number of cabinets that consist of exactly the same parties as the foregoing government varies between more than 80 percent for Australia and less than 10 percent for Finland. Of course this measure also depends on the number of parties in the parliament and it does not reflect the real durability of countries like Italy or Japan, where the largest Party (DC, LDP) stayed in office for long periods while smaller coalition partners kept changing. The alternation rate, a measure adapted from Strom (1990, p.125) takes these problems into account. It is the seat share of parties that had been part of the foregoing government but which are no longer part of the current cabinet plus the seatshare of parties that entered the current government (Jäckle, 2011, p.316). Looking at the alternation rate, Italy is now one of the most stable countries – again we see that a country being instable according to one stability definition may be stable with regard to other notions of stability. Another way to account for the durability of parties is to look at the percentage of parties returning from the foregoing

government. Using this operationalization of returnability, Australia and Austria show the highest values, meaning the most durable performance, while the frequent complete changes of parties within governments in Ireland show that despite of quite average values for the mean duration values, this country can also be seen as unstable with respect to its returnability. The following Cox-models try to explain which factors lead to longlasting cabinets and whether these factors also influence prime ministerial and party duration.

4. Results of the Cox-models

Having seen the variance between the countries in table 2, the results of the fixed effects models presented in table A1 in the annex are not surprising, at least when it comes to the country-effects. We also find strong evidence for temporal fixed effects. All coefficients have to be interpreted in comparison to the reference category which is Italy in the 1980s. Looking only at the pooled models we find that the hazard for prime ministers and hence the hazard for cabinets was on average higher in the 1940s and to some extent in the 1950s than during the reference period in Italy. From the 1990s onwards the hazards for all three dependent variables were significantly lower than the reference category. The country dummies show that Italy is definitely among the most instable countries with regard to cabinet and prime ministerial duration: France and Japan are the only countries not having on average a significantly lower hazard than Italy in the 1980s. But for party duration the picture changes: The long period of DC government results in the fact that only in Germany, the Netherlands and in New Zealand the hazards for the party duration are lower than during the reference period in Italy.

The first models presented above in table 3 and 4 compare the pooled, the replacement and the early election models for cabinet duration.⁸ We find that SPG have a lower hazard than the reference category of MWC. SPMIN are less durable than MWC, especially because of a higher hazard for early elections. SC on the other hand are not significantly different to MWC with respect to early elections but they show a much higher hazard for replacements than the reference category. MPMIN finally are less durable in all three models. Caretaker governments show the expected results: they have higher hazards especially for early elections. The other structural attributes also show results: parliamentary fragmentation fosters the replacement hazard, proportional representation reduces all types of hazards, especially the early election one, and older prime ministers are replaced more frequently than younger ones. We also find effects for investiture (and here the necessity to conduct a competing risks analysis becomes very obvious, as the positive effect on replacements and the negative effect on early elections

⁸ The Grambsch-Therneau test on proportionality of the hazards indicates some problems for SPG and the constitutional constraints for early elections. According to Therneau and Grambsch the results of their test should be seen with some suspicion and analysts should always ask themselves two questions when the test indicates non-proportionality: 1) "Does it matter?" 2) "Is it real?" (Therneau & Grambsch, 2000, p.142). Plotting Schoenfeld residuals versus analysis time does only show minor deviations from linearity for these variables. Therefore, and because of reasons of comparability between the models we abstained from including interaction terms for these problematic variables with time as it is generally recommended when the proportionality assumption does not hold (see Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p.136 ff).

cancel each other out in the pooled model) and for constitutional constraints to call for early elections. The post-election status and the time remaining till the end of the CIEP show the expected results. Comparing the parliamentary effects (table 3) with the cabinet effects (table 4) we can conclude that the lower hazard for left-dominated parliaments does not have equivalence in the ideology of the cabinet. The effects of the fragmentation of cabinet parties on the other hand are in line with the effects of parliamentary fragmentation and more fragmented parliaments (cabinets) lead to more replacements. The ideological differences between the cabinet parties, measured by the standard deviation of their left-right position, show expected results: A high difference on the left-right scale increases the replacement hazard.

For the comparison between cabinet, prime ministerial and party duration we will focus on the effects of the cabinet characteristics.⁹ Table 5 shows all nine models. The variables indicate that types of governments show very similar results across our three dependent variables. Only the slightly significant effect of SPG for parties terminating due to replacements can be seen as a difference to the other models. The ideological position of the cabinet does not show any effects – left governments, prime ministers heading those and parties participating in those cabinets do not have significantly different hazard rates (pooled/replacements/early elections) than more right wing governments. A first real difference emerges for the electoral system variable. Due to the fact that we control for fragmentation, we do not find an overall increasing effect of PR-systems on the replacement hazard as the classic assumption stated by Duverger (1964, p.245-255) and Sartori (1966, p.173) would suggest. On the other hand the significant effect of PR-systems on early election hazards for cabinet and party durations corroborates the results of previous studies finding an additional effect of the electoral system apart from its indirect effect via party fragmentation. The reducing effect of PR-Systems on the replacement hazards for prime ministerial duration nevertheless comes as a surprise and shall be investigated further. Taken as a whole these results back studies which do not find overall effects for electoral systems but more differentiated effects depending on the context and type of dependent variable (Furlong, 1991, p.58-59; Jäckle, 2009, p.24).

As hypothesized, fragmentation within cabinet increases the risk for replacements, and it does not affect the early election hazards. This is true for all three dependent variables. The two control variables *post-election status* and *caretaker* also exhibit the expected effects. The time remaining till the end of the CIEP reduces the early election hazard for cabinet and party duration but does not show any influences on prime ministerial durability. The investiture requirement is another variable that has very different effects on the three dependent variables: While for cabinet durations it has a negative effect on the early election and a positive effect on the replacement hazard rate, it shows both in the premier duration and party duration models only the positive effect on the replacement hazard rate. We find a significant effect for the constitutional constraints in restraining early elections, but as

⁹ The models for the parliamentary effects can be found in table A2 in the annex.

theory would suggest only for the early election models (and as consequence to a smaller extent also in the pooled models).

Conclusion

In this paper we have shown that the stability of governments depends on the unit we investigate: cabinets, parties or prime ministers. There are countries that present a record of long-lasting cabinets, while in other countries prime ministers and/or parties change much more rapidly. The results of our multivariate analysis (Cox-models) show that it is necessary to take into account the effects of cabinet, party and prime ministerial duration and single variables can have different effects on these three depended variables. It was not our goal to answer the question, what is more important for political stability – cabinet, party or prime ministerial duration, but in our view all three operationalizations of office duration can be regarded to have some importance for this question about the impact of stability.

The literature on cabinet duration is the most extend and advanced work of government stability and formed the basis of our study. Here we replicate most of the earlier findings and test the impact of known effects for cabinet stability on the duration of governing parties and prime ministers. A majority of these factors show similar effects across all three indicators of office durability. Nevertheless, there are some significant differences in the impact of certain variables: Institutional constrains on calling early elections have a positive impact on all types of office duration but this effect is stronger for the duration of cabinets than for the durability of prime ministers and parties.

Our analysis provides a first step in distinguishing the different effects on office duration. Further steps may include an explicit control for critical event effects (e.g. unemployment, inflation) which are at the moment only implicitly accounted for through the stochastic component of the Cox-model and alternative operationalizations of the dependent variable, like the alternation rate or returnability.

Table 3: Cox models – cabinet duration, parliamentary effects

	pooled	replacements	early elections
SPG	0.899 (0.155)	0.616** (0.146)	1.185 (0.329)
SPMIN	2.016*** (0.322)	1.683*** (0.330)	3.120*** (0.880)
SC	1.802*** (0.259)	2.070*** (0.345)	1.239 (0.371)
MPMIN	1.874*** (0.324)	1.954*** (0.403)	1.842* (0.622)
Left-right (parliament)	0.896 (0.0628)	0.817** (0.0665)	1.071 (0.154)
Electoral System (PR)	0.611*** (0.0794)	0.618*** (0.0983)	0.615** (0.148)
ENP (parliament)	1.144*** (0.0523)	1.193*** (0.0603)	0.927 (0.105)
Post-election	0.385*** (0.0533)	0.428*** (0.0718)	0.266*** (0.0648)
Caretaker	5.287*** (1.283)	3.041*** (1.049)	10.71*** (4.302)
Dif CIEP	0.955 (0.0586)	1.184** (0.0919)	0.616*** (0.0676)
Investitur	1.104 (0.118)	1.356** (0.172)	0.617** (0.134)
Constraints early elections	0.763*** (0.0660)	1.003 (0.102)	0.396*** (0.0740)
Age prime minister (tv)	1.022*** (0.00629)	1.029*** (0.00769)	1.008 (0.0112)
Observations	460,279	460,279	460,279
N_sub	648	648	648
N_fail	445	295	150
ll	-2376	-1609	-713.7
chi2	242.9	162.8	223.9

hazard ratios, se in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Cox models – cabinet duration, cabinet effects

	pooled	replacements	early elections
SPG	1.027 (0.197)	0.778 (0.203)	1.107 (0.346)
SPMIN	2.655*** (0.516)	2.615*** (0.626)	2.708*** (0.948)
SC	1.756*** (0.259)	1.996*** (0.342)	1.259 (0.383)
MPMIN	2.140*** (0.373)	2.333*** (0.489)	1.673 (0.556)
Left-right (cabinet)	1.026 (0.0372)	1.039 (0.0482)	0.998 (0.0581)
Electoral System (PR)	0.708*** (0.0917)	0.799 (0.131)	0.580** (0.133)
ENP (cabinet)	1.238*** (0.0970)	1.316*** (0.113)	0.890 (0.175)
Post-election	0.385*** (0.0542)	0.430*** (0.0735)	0.264*** (0.0650)
Caretaker	5.340*** (1.285)	2.818*** (0.967)	9.943*** (3.941)
Dif CIEP	0.946 (0.0587)	1.155* (0.0900)	0.619*** (0.0691)
Investitur	1.108 (0.119)	1.394*** (0.177)	0.626** (0.135)
Constraints early elections	0.753*** (0.0666)	0.977 (0.102)	0.399*** (0.0760)
SD left-right cabinet	1.086 (0.0999)	1.192 (0.132)	0.936 (0.168)
Age prime minister (tv)	1.023*** (0.00622)	1.032*** (0.00758)	1.007 (0.0112)
Observations	460,279	460,279	460,279
N_sub	648	648	648
N_fail	445	295	150
ll	-2376	-1610	-713.8
chi2	242.0	161.4	223.8

hazard ratios, se in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Cox models – cabinet, prime minister and party duration compared (cabinet effects)

	cabinet duration			prime minister duration			party duration		
	pooled	replacements	early elections	pooled	replacements	early elections	pooled	replacements	early elections
SPG	1.027 (0.197)	0.778 (0.203)	1.107 (0.346)	1.113 (0.289)	0.945 (0.291)	1.677 (0.863)	0.686 (0.201)	0.309** (0.154)	0.942 (0.415)
SPMIN	2.655*** (0.516)	2.615*** (0.626)	2.708*** (0.948)	2.659*** (0.690)	2.663*** (0.790)	2.385 (1.298)	1.694* (0.467)	1.611 (0.546)	1.609 (0.789)
SC	1.756*** (0.259)	1.996*** (0.342)	1.259 (0.383)	1.633** (0.313)	1.770*** (0.382)	1.202 (0.520)	1.282 (0.197)	1.435** (0.256)	0.833 (0.270)
MPPMIN	2.140*** (0.373)	2.333*** (0.489)	1.673 (0.556)	2.170*** (0.493)	2.132*** (0.565)	1.999 (0.933)	2.172*** (0.379)	2.535*** (0.515)	1.224 (0.443)
Left-right (cabinet)	1.026 (0.0372)	1.039 (0.0482)	0.998 (0.0581)	1.064 (0.0514)	1.048 (0.0575)	1.114 (0.117)	0.994 (0.0471)	0.980 (0.0535)	1.005 (0.0947)
Electoral System (PR)	0.708*** (0.0917)	0.799 (0.131)	0.580** (0.133)	0.614*** (0.105)	0.578*** (0.113)	0.699 (0.262)	0.725** (0.116)	0.795 (0.153)	0.510** (0.157)
ENP (cabinet)	1.238*** (0.0970)	1.316*** (0.113)	0.890 (0.175)	1.206* (0.118)	1.254** (0.134)	0.970 (0.239)	1.117 (0.0859)	1.216** (0.104)	0.794 (0.147)
Post-election	0.385*** (0.0542)	0.430*** (0.0735)	0.264*** (0.0650)	0.379*** (0.0721)	0.468*** (0.102)	0.180*** (0.0720)	0.485*** (0.0781)	0.558*** (0.105)	0.233*** (0.0781)
Caretaker	5.340*** (1.285)	2.818*** (0.967)	9.943*** (3.941)	4.036*** (1.196)	2.070* (0.906)	10.88*** (5.340)	3.744*** (0.834)	2.217*** (0.667)	8.840*** (3.422)
Dif CIEP	0.946 (0.0587)	1.155* (0.0900)	0.619*** (0.0691)	1.032 (0.0808)	1.111 (0.103)	0.870 (0.133)	0.973 (0.0682)	1.105 (0.0945)	0.810* (0.103)
Investitur	1.108 (0.119)	1.394*** (0.177)	0.626** (0.135)	1.235 (0.173)	1.398** (0.223)	0.831 (0.255)	1.272* (0.157)	1.348** (0.192)	1.063 (0.272)
Constraints early elections	0.753*** (0.0666)	0.977 (0.102)	0.399*** (0.0760)	0.964 (0.111)	1.151 (0.152)	0.558** (0.148)	0.940 (0.0962)	1.136 (0.133)	0.605** (0.142)
SD left-right cabinet	1.086 (0.0999)	1.192 (0.132)	0.936 (0.168)	1.311** (0.155)	1.372** (0.185)	1.218 (0.319)	1.096 (0.115)	1.132 (0.139)	1.053 (0.223)
Age prime minister (tv)	1.023*** (0.00622)	1.032*** (0.00758)	1.007 (0.0112)	1.032*** (0.00824)	1.043*** (0.00947)	0.995 (0.0179)	1.025*** (0.00728)	1.040*** (0.00858)	0.986 (0.0148)
Observations	460,279	460,279	460,279	460,193	460,193	460,193	968,522	968,522	968,522
N_sub	648	648	648	370	370	370	481	481	481
N_fail	445	295	150	261	197	64	319	232	87
ll	-2376	-1610	-713.8	-1229	-939.2	-269.7	-1550	-1150	-358.0
chi2	242.0	161.4	223.8	142.0	104.7	87.28	151.5	113.9	124.6

hazard ratios, se in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Annex:

Table A1: Temporal and spatial fixed effects (Italy 1980s as reference)

	cabinet duration			prime minister duration			party duration		
	pooled	replacements	early elections	pooled	replacements	early elections	pooled	replacements	early elections
decade_40	1.870*** (0.396)	1.995*** (0.507)	1.668 (0.647)	2.148*** (0.596)	2.200** (0.712)	2.244 (1.235)	1.430 (0.693)	1.050 (0.705)	2.841 (2.102)
decade_50	1.198 (0.190)	1.300 (0.252)	0.984 (0.276)	1.495* (0.314)	1.783** (0.436)	0.876 (0.377)	0.941 (0.321)	1.426 (0.604)	0.369 (0.253)
decade_60	0.753 (0.137)	0.678* (0.157)	0.931 (0.277)	0.665 (0.169)	0.726 (0.215)	0.561 (0.282)	0.332** (0.151)	0.379 (0.232)	0.266* (0.188)
decade_70	0.995 (0.157)	1.077 (0.209)	0.838 (0.228)	1.079 (0.232)	1.166 (0.296)	0.892 (0.370)	0.851 (0.292)	1.181 (0.519)	0.434 (0.260)
decade_90	0.602*** (0.106)	0.643** (0.140)	0.544** (0.166)	0.598** (0.147)	0.723 (0.205)	0.337** (0.172)	0.468** (0.177)	0.510 (0.262)	0.348* (0.206)
decade_00	0.555*** (0.0901)	0.570*** (0.117)	0.545** (0.145)	0.668* (0.145)	0.754 (0.194)	0.470* (0.195)	0.538* (0.171)	0.686 (0.291)	0.360** (0.178)
AUS	0.297*** (0.0822)	0.111*** (0.0485)	1.740 (0.879)	0.143*** (0.0632)	0.159*** (0.0764)	0.0876** (0.102)	0.258 (0.217)	0.164 (0.184)	0.588 (0.835)
AUT	0.305*** (0.0803)	0.189*** (0.0643)	1.150 (0.603)	0.120*** (0.0589)	0.0917*** (0.0568)	0.234* (0.202)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
BEL	0.539*** (0.120)	0.565** (0.135)	0.561 (0.342)	0.600* (0.175)	0.646 (0.205)	0.455 (0.335)	0.639 (0.410)	0.508 (0.392)	1.035 (1.292)
CAN	0.292*** (0.0749)	0.156*** (0.0561)	1.160 (0.584)	0.291*** (0.103)	0.247*** (0.104)	0.472 (0.328)	0.840 (0.501)	0.484 (0.375)	2.209 (2.524)
DEU	0.165*** (0.0577)	0.204*** (0.0719)	0 (0)	0.121*** (0.0613)	0.161*** (0.0830)	0 (0)	0.126* (0.139)	0.184 (0.206)	0 (0)
DNK	0.493*** (0.114)	0.280*** (0.0839)	2.093 (1.017)	0.336*** (0.116)	0.246*** (0.106)	0.719 (0.462)	1.373 (0.768)	0.781 (0.534)	3.554 (3.962)
ESP	0.224*** (0.0915)	0.0395*** (0.0401)	1.363 (0.806)	0.154*** (0.0959)	0.0689*** (0.0710)	0.372 (0.361)	0.504 (0.429)	0 (0)	2.094 (2.637)
FIN	0.435*** (0.107)	0.483*** (0.123)	0.142* (0.154)	0.525** (0.163)	0.593 (0.194)	0.190 (0.208)	1.168 (0.680)	1.297 (0.813)	0 (0)
FRA	0.965 (0.194)	0.746 (0.171)	2.617** (1.258)	1.327 (0.323)	1.090 (0.305)	2.418* (1.281)	1.233 (0.717)	0.377 (0.330)	5.015 (5.563)
GBR	0.241*** (0.0667)	0.0645*** (0.0340)	1.347 (0.670)	0.312*** (0.108)	0.0645*** (0.0476)	1.385 (0.781)	0.818 (0.485)	0.142* (0.160)	3.580 (3.929)
GRC	0.397*** (0.126)	0.185*** (0.0886)	1.799 (0.995)	0.438* (0.188)	0.320** (0.175)	0.934 (0.702)	1.447 (0.909)	0.915 (0.721)	3.244 (3.873)
IRL	0.217*** (0.0618)	0.201*** (0.0645)	0.383 (0.250)	0.364*** (0.119)	0.385*** (0.137)	0.276 (0.233)	1.260 (0.704)	1.203 (0.751)	1.275 (1.588)
ISL	0.259*** (0.0719)	0.224*** (0.0716)	0.546 (0.334)	0.395*** (0.127)	0.389*** (0.139)	0.428 (0.316)	0.860 (0.514)	0.711 (0.487)	1.270 (1.583)
JPN	0.817 (0.170)	0.579** (0.142)	2.631** (1.263)	0.861 (0.234)	1.011 (0.290)	0.192 (0.211)	0.985 (0.614)	0.884 (0.644)	1.586 (1.989)
LUX	0.0770*** (0.0311)	0.0643*** (0.0320)	0.191** (0.141)	0.0542*** (0.0344)	0.0718*** (0.0461)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
NLD	0.261*** (0.0713)	0.188*** (0.0642)	0.782 (0.429)	0.229*** (0.0890)	0.0972*** (0.0601)	0.770 (0.481)	0.129* (0.141)	0.176 (0.198)	0 (0)
NOR	0.164*** (0.0548)	0.196*** (0.0664)	0 (0)	0.296*** (0.109)	0.370*** (0.140)	0 (0)	0.925 (0.548)	1.121 (0.713)	0 (0)
NZL	0.144*** (0.0525)	0.110*** (0.0482)	0.400 (0.285)	0.128*** (0.0626)	0.128*** (0.0702)	0.127* (0.141)	0.142* (0.156)	0 (0)	0.736 (1.055)
PRT	0.480** (0.148)	0.464** (0.160)	0.748 (0.538)	0.627 (0.244)	0.626 (0.274)	0.708 (0.604)	2.159 (1.325)	1.731 (1.216)	3.970 (5.069)
SWE	0.121*** (0.0461)	0.125*** (0.0512)	0.115** (0.124)	0.0424*** (0.0316)	0.0537*** (0.0405)	0 (0)	0.151* (0.166)	0.192 (0.215)	0 (0)
Observations	673	673	673	672	672	673	672	672	673
N_sub	673	673	673	381	381	381	211	211	211
N_fail	450	299	151	262	198	64	102	63	39
ll	-2420	-1617	-771.2	-1226	-927.3	-273.9	-404.5	-248.7	-133.7
chi2	258.0	222.1	137.2	177.7	153.0	84.65	81.10	62.34	62.95

se in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2: Cox models – cabinet duration, parliamentary effects

	Cabinet duration			prime minister duration			party duration		
	pooled	replacements	early elections	pooled	replacements	early elections	pooled	replacements	early elections
SPG	0.899 (0.155)	0.616** (0.146)	1.185 (0.329)	0.833 (0.191)	0.680 (0.186)	1.302 (0.582)	0.548** (0.150)	0.227*** (0.109)	0.985 (0.391)
SPMIN	2.016*** (0.322)	1.683*** (0.330)	3.120*** (0.880)	1.672** (0.350)	1.579* (0.377)	1.853 (0.812)	1.293 (0.309)	1.079 (0.321)	1.888 (0.784)
SC	1.802*** (0.259)	2.070*** (0.345)	1.239 (0.371)	1.708*** (0.320)	1.862*** (0.392)	1.214 (0.515)	1.391** (0.211)	1.638*** (0.288)	0.804 (0.258)
MPMIN	1.874*** (0.324)	1.954*** (0.403)	1.842* (0.622)	1.832*** (0.411)	1.782** (0.465)	1.890 (0.873)	2.184*** (0.381)	2.490*** (0.503)	1.383 (0.504)
Left-right (parliament)	0.896 (0.0628)	0.817** (0.0665)	1.071 (0.154)	0.890 (0.0772)	0.893 (0.0868)	0.828 (0.178)	0.849* (0.0777)	0.829* (0.0865)	0.871 (0.174)
Electoral System (PR)	0.611*** (0.0794)	0.618*** (0.0983)	0.615** (0.148)	0.481*** (0.0811)	0.442*** (0.0845)	0.568 (0.211)	0.653*** (0.0988)	0.683** (0.123)	0.482** (0.145)
ENP (parliament)	1.144*** (0.0523)	1.193*** (0.0603)	0.927 (0.105)	1.142** (0.0670)	1.182*** (0.0766)	0.945 (0.136)	0.964 (0.0471)	0.982 (0.0552)	0.904 (0.100)
Post-election	0.385*** (0.0533)	0.428*** (0.0718)	0.266*** (0.0648)	0.368*** (0.0690)	0.454*** (0.0973)	0.165*** (0.0652)	0.495*** (0.0790)	0.595*** (0.111)	0.226*** (0.0737)
Caretaker	5.287*** (1.283)	3.041*** (1.049)	10.71*** (4.302)	4.090*** (1.217)	2.242* (0.983)	10.96*** (5.290)	4.083*** (0.918)	2.565*** (0.770)	8.326*** (3.256)
Dif CIEP	0.955 (0.0586)	1.184** (0.0919)	0.616*** (0.0676)	1.069 (0.0823)	1.154 (0.105)	0.903 (0.135)	0.983 (0.0674)	1.102 (0.0919)	0.818 (0.102)
Investitur	1.104 (0.118)	1.356** (0.172)	0.617** (0.134)	1.223 (0.171)	1.377** (0.219)	0.811 (0.248)	1.306** (0.162)	1.409** (0.202)	1.058 (0.273)
Constraints early elections	0.763*** (0.0660)	1.003 (0.102)	0.396*** (0.0740)	0.979 (0.111)	1.182 (0.153)	0.543** (0.139)	1.000 (0.0977)	1.238* (0.139)	0.577** (0.132)
Age prime minister (tv)	1.022*** (0.00629)	1.029*** (0.00769)	1.008 (0.0112)	1.030*** (0.00833)	1.041*** (0.00955)	0.993 (0.0177)	1.020*** (0.00728)	1.034*** (0.00852)	0.985 (0.0148)
Observations	460,279	460,279	460,279	460,193	460,193	460,193	968,522	968,522	968,522
N_sub	648	648	648	370	370	370	481	481	481
N_fail	445	295	150	261	197	64	319	232	87
ll	-2376	-1609	-713.7	-1231	-941.6	-269.9	-1550	-1153	-358.2
chi2	242.9	162.8	223.9	137.2	99.78	86.84	150.8	107.9	124.2

hazard ratios, se in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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